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Scaling the Costs of 404 Testing to Fit the Needs of Small Public Companies 
 
Abstract 
In July of 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by Congress, including 
section 404 which requires the auditors to test and opine on the company’s internal 
controls.  Since that time there has been much debate about whether the intended benefits 
of increased investor confidence and financial statement transparency trump the 
unexpectedly high compliance costs, especially for public companies with market-caps 
less than $75 million.  Before these companies begin complying in the upcoming year, 
interest groups are calling for the requirements to be ‘scaled’ to better fit the needs of 
these companies.  While auditors already are expected to scale their audit approach to 
each individual client, more must be done to significantly decrease the costs in order to 
reverse the trend of small companies foregoing listing on U.S. capital markets.  Increased 
guidance from the PCAOB, SEC, and other related parties could help the small-cap 
companies and their auditors be aware of best practices.  Also, exempting industries that 
already follow similar guidelines or are significantly injured by the compliance 
requirements could help.  Lastly, the controversial proposal of rotational audits could be 
put in place if the affected parties cooperate to remove the undue burden on these small-
cap companies.  Without some form of significant action, the investors could soon lose 
the ability to buy small-cap companies in U.S. markets.
 4 
1.0 Introduction__________________________________________________________ 
With the passing of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002, auditors are now obligated to 
test and opine on the internal controls of publicly-traded clients.  While this was by no 
means the only change to the auditing environment under the Act, it has certainly been 
one of the most contentious.  The process involved in satisfying the section 404 
requirements has added huge costs in terms of capital and human resources to every 
public company audit without exception.  However, these requirements are yet to be 
applied to audits of “non-accelerated filers,” or public companies with a market 
capitalization less than $75 million dollars.  The reason for this exemption is that 
implementing section 404 testing in small-company environments creates an 
exponentially higher cost than it does in large-company environments.  In 2004, large 
corporations, defined as companies with net income greater than $5 billion, spent .06% of 
their revenues on Sarbanes-Oxley related compliance, while voluntary non-accelerated 
filers spent 2.55%1.  This undue burden on small-cap companies, who by nature have less 
capital, human resources, and experience than large corporations, has clearly had a 
detrimental affect on them, and arguably had a negative effect on US capital markets and 
the economy as a whole2.   
Borne from this inequity is the idea of ‘scaling,’ or custom-fitting 404 testing 
requirements, so the burden would be on par with that experienced by accelerated filers.  
While the SEC has started down the correct path by issuing guidance3 on how to 
appropriately satisfy SOX requirements in a capital and labor-efficient manner, this is 
only a minor part in the scaling process.  Numerous advocacy groups, including the 
                                                 
1
 “SOX 404: The Section of Unintended Consequences and its Impact on Small Business.” AEA, 2/05 
2
 “SOX and the Flow of International Listings” J. Piotroski and S. Srinivasan, 4/07 
3
 “Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting” SEC, 12/20/06 
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American Electronics Association, the International Association of Small Broker Dealers 
and Advisors, and the Silicon Valley Leadership Group have all issued their own 
comments on how to most appropriately apply section 404 to non-accelerated filers.  Not 
surprisingly, they all take a relatively extreme approach, suggesting that the requirements 
never be applied, or at least not until a much more cost effective version is released.  
However, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox has nixed the idea of exempting small public 
companies by saying “…there should not be a second tier of integrity of a company’s 
internal controls4.”  The idea of not applying section 404 to non-accelerated filers was 
also downplayed by others, such as PCAOB member Daniel Goetzer, who said “SOX 
was created in haste, but we should not fix it in haste5.”  Clearly, a compromise between 
the two positions is needed.   
2.0 What “Scaling 404 Requirements” Means_______________________________ 
“Scaling 404 Requirements” is defined as adjusting the 404 audit approach to 
make it more economically efficient for small-cap companies.  A one-size-fits-all 
approach to auditing is too expensive for many smaller companies.  However, simply 
imploring auditors to change their approach will not do enough to significantly reduce the 
costs of 404 audits.  Other tactics include guidance, released either by the PCAOB, SEC, 
FASB, or even private companies and organizations that have experience in satisfying 
404 requirements.  Any rules or standards released by the PCAOB will help clarify the 
responsibilities of auditors and suggest more efficient practices.  Scaling can come in the 
form of industry exemptions, new auditing procedures, and the promotion of other 
internal control frameworks that may be more suitable than COSO.  More than anything, 
                                                 
4
 “SEC Seeks to Ease the 404 Burden” Ken Rankin, 11/27/06 
5
 “SEC Seeks to Ease the 404 Burden” Ken Rankin, 11/27/06 
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scaling 404 is the removal of communication barriers between the players involved.  
Currently, CPAs generally take a very conservative approach when auditing public 
companies for fear of not fully complying with 404 requirements6.  Clients generally just 
do as they’re told by auditors, rather than analyzing themselves and determining what 
policies, procedures, and internal structure works best for them7.  Lastly, government 
agencies, fearful of another accounting scandal, are slow to take the necessary steps to 
return equality to the auditing environment, even in the face of heavy criticism and 
soaring costs.  If the correct mix of scaling procedures is enacted by all parties involved, 
some level of equality will return. 
3.0 The Need for Scaling___________________________________________________ 
The crippling effects of Sarbanes Oxley section 404 testing requirements have 
been felt by numerous entities, including the businesses themselves, investors, and the 
US capital markets.  Since the passing of Sarbanes Oxley in 2002, average costs of 404 
audits for smaller public companies are about $1 million dollars, compared to just $4 
million dollars for large accelerated filers8.  This is a far cry from the 2003 SEC estimate, 
which stated that expected costs of implementing 404 would be, in the aggregate, $1.24 
billion, or about $91,000 per public company9.  Clearly, the costs of 404 are too high and 
not evenly distributed.  However, it is not just the firms paying these fees that are 
harmed.  Investors, as well as the economy as a whole, have felt the effects and have 
demanded change. 
                                                 
6
 “Comments on Proposed  Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting” Silicon 
Valley Leadership Council, 2/26/07 
7
 “Comments on SEC Concept Release 34-54122 over Internal Control over Financial Reporting.” 
American Electronics Association, 9/18/06 
8
 “Sized-Based Reporting Standards Needed to Maintain Economy” 3/13/06 
9
 “Painful Memories: SEC Grilled on 404 Costs” David M. Katz, 6/12/07 
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3.1 Impact on Small-Cap Companies 
While accelerated filers are generally able to take the hit of the higher-than-
expected (but still relatively negligible) costs, small companies generally do not have the 
resources to handle it.  Sarbanes Oxley, which was created as a reaction to the accounting 
scandals of large corporations such as Enron and WorldCom, has clearly been a much 
greater inconvenience on small-cap companies.  Even though the 3-year average costs for 
accelerated filers fell 23% from 2004-06 to 2005-0710, the costs have still been 
exponentially higher than anticipated.  The fact that these filers are experiencing a 
disproportionate amount of the effects signals a serious need for change.  
3.2 Impact on Investors 
In the 5+ years since SOX was passed, investors in American capital markets 
have been stripped of many of the opportunities to identify star growth-oriented 
companies, simply because these companies either fear going public due to the cost, or 
choose to register on foreign exchanges with less stringent oversight.  Companies with 
potential similar to early Starbucks or Microsoft, for example, may no longer have the 
opportunity to grow and thrive on US exchanges in the post-Sox environment11.  This 
loss of potential profitable public companies to invest in can be observed when 
comparing the NASDAQ and the NYSE to similar foreign markets that have experienced 
comparable economic, political, and social events as their American peers.  An extensive 
study done at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business compared the state 
of the US markets to the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the Alternative Investment 
Exchange (AIM), also in London.  The authors argue that the four exchanges are 
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 “How Low Can Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Costs Go?” C. de Mesa Graziano and W. Stinnet, 8/20/07 
11
 “Sized-Based Reporting Standards Needed to Maintain Economy” 3/13/06 
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relatively equitable since in the pre-SOX era, the majority of U.S.-based “defectors” 
chose to list on either the AIM or LSE because of their similarities12.  While the number 
of new listings on all four exchanges has declined in the post-Enron era, when controlling 
for SOX, there is a noticeable trend in small-cap companies shying away from listing on 
the American capital markets.  The UK, realizing the opportunity that the high costs of 
404 implementation represented, began heavily promoting the AIM to smaller US 
companies as a “liquid exchange with strong investor protections”13.  Ironically, this was 
one of the attractive features of the NASDAQ before SOX was put into effect.  Now, the 
most appealing feature of US markets has become the credibility associated with listing 
on a market with stricter regulations, which is an attribute few small firms can afford or 
are willing to pay for.  This conclusion is readily observable when studying the facts.  For 
example, the number of foreign listings on US markets fell 63% in the four quarters 
following the passing of SOX in 200214.  If this drop was due to reasons outside of the 
Act, then one could expect to see a somewhat similar drop in foreign listings on the LSE.  
However, in the same time period, these listings doubled15.  The market that was, for 
years, considered an alternative for US companies that could not get listed on the NYSE 
or NASDAQ now appears to be the preferred one.  In addition, firms listing on US 
markets are, on average, less profitable than firms listed on UK markets since the 
effective date of SOX.  However, this loss in profitability is not stratified evenly across 
all companies.  In fact, NYSE-listed companies are about even with LSE firms, meaning 
that almost all of the loss in profitability occurred in the firms listed on NASDAQ when 
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 “SOX and the Flow of International Listings” J. Piotroski and S. Srinivasan, 4/07 
13
 “SOX and the Flow of International Listings” J. Piotroski and S. Srinivasan, 4/07 
14
 “SOX and the Flow of International Listings” J. Piotroski and S. Srinivasan, 4/07 
15
 “SOX and the Flow of International Listings” J. Piotroski and S. Srinivasan, 4/07 
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compared to the AIM16.  These firms are generally the smaller, less-profitable companies 
that are looking for a cheap yet safe way to go public.  In fact, even after controlling for 
US companies that likely would have listed on the AIM independent of SOX, the total 
amount of new market capitalization lost to UK markets, when aggregated, was 21.5 
billion17.  The opposite trend can be seen when looking at companies expected to list on 
the LSE in the pre-SOX era that have chosen to list on the NYSE instead, which totals 
about 34.8 billion in market capitalization18.  Clearly, there is a shift occurring in USA 
capital markets.  For large companies that can more easily absorb the cost of 404 testing, 
the reputation associated with satisfying the stringent requirements of SOX are worth the 
costs.  However, firms with limited capital and resources clearly to do not feel the same 
way.  This means that US investors are slowly being stripped of the opportunity to invest 
in these small, growth-oriented companies. 
3.3 Impact on U.S. Economy 
To compound this drawback, the US economy as a whole has felt the effects of 
the high costs of 404.  The share of total global equity raised in US markets, which is a 
common indicator of relative market attractiveness, has dropped from 28.8% in 2002 to 
19.2% in 200719.  America, which used to be the clear leader in market attractiveness, has 
seen a severe drop in the post-SOX years.  Listing on a US capital market is becoming 
little more than a way for foreign firms from countries with weak regulations to provide 
credibility to their assertions.  The attributes that used to make US markets desirable, 
including liquidity, managerial access to more capital, and lower cost of capital, have 
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 “SOX and the Flow of International Listings” J. Piotroski and S. Srinivasan, 4/07 
17
 “SOX and the Flow of International Listings” J. Piotroski and S. Srinivasan, 4/07 
18
 “SOX and the Flow of International Listings” J. Piotroski and S. Srinivasan, 4/07 
19
 “The Competitive Position of the US Public Equity Market” Comm. on Capital Mkts Reg., 12/4/07 
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begun to disappear.  From 1996 to 2005, the value of IPOs from US firms listing only on 
foreign exchanges (in terms of all IPOs from that time) was .1%, while during the first 
three quarters in 2007, the value was 4.3%20.  However, US markets are not only losing 
prospective IPOs.  The data suggests that they are also losing companies already listed on 
them as well.  The number of foreign firms delisting from the NYSE in 1997 was 12, or 
about 4% of all listed foreign companies.  By 2006, this number increased to 30 (6.6%), 
and by October of 2007, the number of companies delisting was at 56, or 12.4%.  Not 
only is there a trend of delisting, but it is growing at an alarming rate.  In fact, Tracey 
Pierce, the head of the LSE’s international business development program, stated that “in 
our discussions with [US companies listing on the LSE], the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley is 
factoring heavily in their decision-making.”21  This significant loss of competitiveness of 
US markets is summed in Exhibit B.  While there is seemingly little doubt about the 
overreaching effects that the costs of 404 have caused, the solution is not as simple as 
relieving non-accelerated filers from their obligations to conform with 404 requirements.  
There is value to be gained, even for small-cap companies, from internal control testing.  
The question is: How do we balance the need for financial statement transparency with 
the needs of these companies? 
4.0 Necessity of Section 404_for Small-Cap Companies_________________________ 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act was passed in 2002 with the intent of combating fraud, 
making financial statements more reliable, and restoring investor confidence22.  
Obviously, all of these ideas are applicable to small-cap companies as well as large-cap.  
Investors demand useful, relevant, and accurate information so they can make informed 
                                                 
20
 “The Competitive Position of the US Public Equity Market” Comm. on Capital Mkts Reg., 12/4/07 
21
 “SOX and the Flow of International Listings” J. Piotroski and S. Srinivasan, 4/07 
22
 “The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes Oxley” Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, 4/06 
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decisions.  The welfare of the American economy depends on these investors making 
logical choices by allocating capital to the most deserving companies.  Even with high 
costs, the value of data integrity cannot be ignored.  Especially now, in times when 
investor confidence is low, ensuring the integrity of financial information is the ultimate 
priority.   Even though small-cap companies contribute less to the overall health of the 
economy than accelerated filers do, they still influence it greatly.  Financial Executives 
International’s ‘Small Public Company Task Force’ chairman Richard Brounstein 
supports this assertion, saying “the U.S. economy depends on smaller companies, 
particularly for innovation and new-job creation.23”  Therefore, ensuring the integrity of 
small-company financial statements is necessary to a functioning economy. 
4.1 Improvements in Procedures 
While there are some clear benefits for investors in subjecting these companies to 
404 testing, including increased financial statement transparency, the companies being 
tested reap some benefits as well.  One survey shows that 404 has made companies more 
efficient, and employees are now all being held to a higher standard of ethics and are 
taking more responsibility than before24.   Yet, in most cases, these qualitative benefits 
are overlooked.  This is most likely due to the fact that it is nearly impossible to calculate 
the qualitative benefits of a better control environment, while very simple to calculate the 
costs of an audit.  Initial implementation of compliance requirements, a dreaded activity 
by accelerated filers everywhere, highlighted numerous weaknesses and gaps in company 
policy that potentially saved these companies millions25.  For example, when PepsiCo 
was first required to comply with section 404, they began to document their pension 
                                                 
23
 “SEC to Revisit ‘One Size Fits All’” Stephen Taub, 12/9/05 
24
 “How Low Can Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Costs Go?” C. de Mesa Graziano and W. Stinnet, 8/20/07 
25
 “The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes Oxley” Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, 4/06 
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accounting processes.  In doing so, they realized that numerous essential steps, including 
account reconciliations and data integrity checks, were not occurring26.  In addition to the 
elimination of weaknesses, there has been a strong trend among accelerated filers of 
standardization and consolidation of key financial processes, elimination of redundant 
information systems, unification of platforms, automation of manual processes, and 
elimination of unnecessary controls, all related to compliance with 40427.  It appears that 
companies are making themselves more efficient and secure simply by complying, which 
frees up capital and resources to be applied elsewhere.  Also, an increased emphasis on 
the importance of governance has obliged companies to hold employees to higher ethical 
standards, train them better, and keep everyone within the company more informed on 
current policies and procedures.  Increased process and control documentation, another 
SOX requirement, clarifies job duties, eases the hiring of new employees, and reduces 
managerial override28.  Small-cap companies can especially benefit from up-to-date job 
descriptions and process documentation in times of employee turnover.  Since processes 
are generally less formalized in these companies, the damage from losses of key 
employees can be minimized by proper documentation, and less key information lost 
with the departure of the employee. 
4.2 Improvements in Audit Efficiency 
Efficiencies borne from 404 compliance can actually make other parts of the audit 
go smoother and quicker, reducing fees in those areas.  Within companies, historical 
practices exist that provide opportunities for fraud and error.  At Sunoco, there existed an 
invoicing system that resulted in four unique billing processes, one for each product 
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 “The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes Oxley” Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, 4/06 
27
 “The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes Oxley” Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, 4/06 
28
 “The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes Oxley” Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, 4/06 
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category.  These differences were not based on logic; rather, they arose purely out of 
industry tradition.  As a result, they changed to a single billing process, which greatly 
reduced the chance of error in the billing process, and reduced the number of costly re-
bills29.  Thanks to this improved invoicing system, the auditors had more confidence in 
the accuracy of their client’s receivables, resulting in less testing.  Sunoco is by no means 
alone in this regard.  There are numerous examples, some recognized and others not, of 
404 improving the efficiency and security of public companies, and small-cap companies 
should not be denied these benefits. 
5.0 How To Scale the Requirements of 404___________________________________ 
 In order to allow small-cap companies to enjoy the benefits of 404, the 
disproportionately high costs must be mitigated.  Barring a complete overhaul of 
Sarbanes Oxley within the next few years, which is highly unlikely, the only feasible 
solution to this problem is to scale the testing requirements for these entities.  After 
researching numerous suggestions from all sides of the argument, I have compiled a 
system that I believe will lower the costs in the long run without damaging the integrity 
of the financial data.  There are three preparatory actions that can be taken to ensure that 
these small public companies are ready to deal with 404 testing requirements when they 
are finally required to comply with them.  These actions are the issuance of specific 
guidance about compliance, the passing of new rules or standards, and industry 
exemptions.  Then, a system of rotational audit procedures can be enacted to lessen the 
annual burden on small companies.  Together, these four suggestions have the ability to 
greatly reduce to potentially devastating costs of section 404 compliance. 
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 “The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes Oxley” Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, 4/06 
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5.1 Guidance 
By nature, small public companies have different internal structures than large 
corporations.  Due to a smaller workforce, segregation of duties is frequently not feasible.  
In addition, less procedure and policy standardization muddles responsibilities and allows 
more subjectivity in decision-making.  Small companies tend to rely more on daily 
interaction of upper management than would normally be seen in a larger company, 
where such constant oversight is impossible.  Due to these unique internal control 
attributes, specific guidance on how to successfully comply with 404 requirements in a 
small-company setting is necessary.  While there exist numerous guidance manuals 
already, an all-inclusive, example-laden release is necessary to clarify what is expected 
from these companies when the auditors begin 404 testing.  In previous guidance 
issuances, specific examples have not generally been offered, which has led to confusion 
on the part the companies, and overly-conservative auditing procedures on the part of the 
CPAs.  Suggestions about how substantive tests should be affected in relation to a weak, 
moderate, and strong control environment would also be helpful for clients and auditors 
alike30.  One non-accelerated filer, Tandy Leather Factory, has an accounting department 
of only 16 people, and only 2 of them have college degrees31.  It is not reasonable to 
assume companies such as this one will accurately and efficiently update their internal 
control structure and documentation simply by following general advice.  In addition, the 
guidance should be more principles-based.  With the passing of SOX, auditors have 
begun to rely on a ‘checklist’ approach, rather than analyzing the unique situations of the 
                                                 
30
 “Comments on Proposed Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting” Silicon 
Valley Leadership Council, 2/27/06 
31
 “What the 404 Delay Means for Small Companies” Sarah Johnson, 12/12/07 
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entities32.  The costs associated with not fully satisfying SOX testing requirements are so 
great, non-efficient and non-effective procedures have become the norm to decrease 
liability.  Sufficient guidance, in association with other scaling policies, may help to ease 
to confusion and fear of both small companies and auditors alike, making the process 
cheaper, more efficient, and more beneficial. 
5.2 New Rules and Standards 
 On July 7, 2007, the SEC approved the PCAOB’s adoption of Auditing Standard 
5 to replace Auditing Standard 2.  The new Standard is considered to be a simpler, more 
principles-based version of A/S 2 intended to encourage a “top-down, risk-based audit 
approach.33”  A/S 5 eliminated several unnecessary procedures, such as requiring auditors 
to opine on the opinion issued by management pertaining to their own internal controls34.  
Also, included in A/S 5 is the recognition that small public companies “may have less 
complex operations… more centralized accounting functions, extensive involvement of 
senior management in the day-to-day activities of the business, and fewer levels of 
management.35”   
While the new Standard is a good first step, more rules are needed to address 
current weaknesses in policy.  One such rule should encourage small companies to 
emphasize the importance of Board involvement and competent governance.  If small-cap 
companies are required to have a more active Board and stricter corporate governance 
policies, auditors will on the whole have greater confidence in the effectiveness of 
                                                 
32
 “Comments on SEC Concept Release 34-54122 on Internal Control over Financial Reporting.” 
American Electronics Association, 9/18/06 
33
 “Coming This Summer: 404 for All” Alan Rappeport, 6/5/07 
34
 “Auditing Standard Number 5” PCAOB, 7/27/07 
35
 “Auditing Standard Number 5” PCAOB, 7/27/07 
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internal controls.  This means compliance costs could be significantly reduced since less 
control and substantive testing will be required36.   
The rules related to the restatement of company financials must also be addressed.  
Many times, restatements pertain to a difference in opinion between auditors and the firm 
relating to a complex transaction rather than an obvious error, oversight, or fraud37.   In 
addition, a Government Accountability Office study in 2006 discovered that 53% of 
restatements had a net effect of less than 1% on company market value38.  Restatements 
are only supposed to be issued when the change is expected to have a material effect on 
the investors’ decisions.  Yet, in 53% of restatements, investors do not seem to react at 
all.  This exposes a trend of conservative auditing, due to the fact that auditing is a 
practice with limited gains, yet unlimited liability39.  Clearly, this is a situation where 
even though the marginal benefits of issuing restated financials are greater than the 
marginal costs, they occur anyway40.     
5.3 Industry Exemptions 
 While all public companies can benefit from more efficient internal controls, there 
are some specific industries where 404 compliance has little value.  The two industries 
with the strongest arguments for exemption are biotech and community banking.  In the 
field of biotechnology, the majority of resources are devoted to research and development 
of medicines intended to save lives and improve quality of life.  The amount of resources 
                                                 
36
 “The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes Oxley” Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, 4/06 
37
 “Comments on SEC Concept Release 34-54122 on Internal Control over Financial Reporting.” 
American Electronics Association, 9/18/06 
38
 “Comments on SEC Proposed Rule: Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial 
Reporting”  Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, 2/26/07 
39
 “Comment on the Proposed Delay of 404 Compliance Requirements for Small Companies” International 
Association of Small Broker Dealers, (undated) 
40
 “Comment on the Proposed Delay of 404 Compliance Requirements for Small Companies” International 
Association of Small Broker Dealers, (undated) 
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diverted away from research in order to comply with 404 requirements can have 
detrimental effects on work being done.  Also, since many biotech firms survive on the 
backing of venture capitalists, they may lose funding to more profitable industries.   
The community banking industry should also be considered for an exemption 
from complying with 404 requirements.  In 1991, the FDIC passed the FDIC 
Improvement Act, forcing banks to evaluate their internal controls.  The main difference 
is that the results of the analysis are not publicly viewable.  Industry advocates claim that 
FDICIA has already solved the internal control issues in the banking industry, citing the 
sharp decline in bank failures since the passing of the Act41.  Even Rep. Michael Oxley, 
co-author of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was quoted as saying that if he had to do it again, 
he would have “eased up on the banking industry.42” 
 If complete industry exemptions are deemed too severe, a compromise could 
come in the form of shareholder approval.  Larry Ribstein, a law professor at the 
University of Illinois and co-author of the book The Sarbanes-Oxley Debacle: What 
We’ve Learned; How to Fix it, suggests allowing the shareholders of companies in 
industries such as community banking and biotechnology to vote on foregoing 404 
compliance.  This way, companies with strong internal controls and competent 
management will be rewarded with more capital and resources. 
5.4 Rotational 404 Audits 
 The solution that could potentially have the greatest effect on cost reduction 
would be rotational 404 audits.  Once again, I utilize the idea of allowing shareholders to 
determine the value of 404 compliance.  Before I continue, an outline of the Silicon 
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Valley Leadership Group’s suggestion for a rotational audit scheme is provided in 
Exhibit A for clarification43.  If a non-accelerated filer successfully completes an audit 
without any material weaknesses being found, their shareholders will be allowed to vote 
on whether or not they want to install a three-year rotation of internal control testing, 
starting with the previous year.  If the shareholders approve the reduced testing, auditors 
will go ahead in year two and reduce their testing of internal controls.  All internal 
controls deemed ‘fundamentally paramount’ by the auditors will be tested in full each 
year, and management will still be required to opine on all internal controls each year.  
However, only 50% of low-risk internal controls will be tested in year two.  Then, in year 
three, 50% of low-risk internal controls will again be tested.  It should be noted that these 
are not necessarily the ‘other’ 50% of internal controls that were not tested in year two.  
In years two and three, a random selection technique should be utilized to select which 
controls are going to be tested that year.  This way, clients will not be able to know which 
controls will not be tested in a given year, lowering the possibility of managerial override 
or fraud relating to a specific control.  Also, the 50% of low-risk internal controls is not 
binding.  Before the selection of controls to be tested is made, the auditors will perform 
preliminary auditing procedures including walkthroughs, inspection of records, and 
observations to identify any new controls put in place, or areas where key personnel have 
changed.  These controls will then automatically be tested.  Then, in a meeting with 
management, any specific low-risk control they wish to be tested will also be tested, 
given the reason provided by management is deemed acceptable.   
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 This process can be immediately halted in two ways.  If, during the annual vote, 
the shareholders opt to revert back to a full audit, the rotation stops and a normal audit 
will occur. Also, if a material weakness is discovered by the auditors, a complete control 
audit will begin immediately.  A pervasive material weakness is described as “more than 
one material weakness or multiple significant deficiencies involving a pervasive break-
down in controls.44”  Then, in the following year, a full 404 audit, free of material 
weakness, must be achieved before shareholders will be given the opportunity to vote 
again for the subsequent year. 
  It is my belief that allowing the shareholders to vote permitting a rotational 404 
audit scheme allows the owners of the company to determine whether or not full 
compliance for small-cap companies has value.  This sentiment is echoed by numerous 
small business advocacy groups, such as the American Electronics Association45.  By 
allowing the financial markets to determine the value of 404 compliance, the decision is 
put in the hands of those affected most by the requirements. 
 However, pushing through such a drastic change would take much compromise 
and cooperation between numerous parties and stakeholders.  First, the laws related to 
auditor liability would have to be revised.  Since auditors would no longer be in complete 
control of what was being tested, they should not have to accept the same responsibility 
that they would if they were able to plan a full audit.  Instead, management should take 
on the additional responsibility since they still must opine on the fitness of all internal 
controls, even if they will not all be tested.   
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 In addition, rotational audits, whereby stockholders vote to reduce testing, do 
remove some amount of auditor judgment that was gained with the release of AS/5.  
Giving this up would be a hit to the auditing community, yet a necessary one for the sake 
of the U.S. economy.  Also, banks may not feel the amount of testing from rotational 
audits is satisfactory to continue to lend money.  However, this should be considered by 
the stockholders before their vote on the audit.  If the banks make it apparent that they 
will call loans if rotational audits are approved, the stockholders may want to consider 
full compliance. 
 Clearly, there are numerous issues that require large amounts of cooperation that 
must be worked out before such a system could be put into place.  However, as more and 
more time passes, small-cap companies will continue to look elsewhere for opportunities 
to raise capital.  The next ten years will show whether or not the US is truly affected by 
the loss of these companies, or if the gain in large internationally-listed companies is 
satisfactory compensation46.   
6.0 Concluding Remarks__________________________________________________ 
 The Sarbanes Oxley Act was created as a response to a loss in investor confidence 
relating to the numerous accounting scandals that occurred in 2002 and the few years 
preceding.  Now, more than five years have passed, and costs and benefits are starting to 
be understood.  The most prevalent issue that arose has been the astonishingly high costs 
of complying with section 404, and how these costs are exponentially higher for small 
public companies.  Since these entities were not the primary “targets” of the Act, there 
has been a call to scale the costs related to complying with section 404 so all public 
companies are affected equally by the Act.  By implementing any or all of these 
                                                 
46
 “SOX and the Flow of International Listings” J. Piotroski and S. Srinivasan, 4/07 
 21 
suggestions, the costs can be incrementally reduced with little to no reduction in investor 
confidence in the integrity of financial data.  And, if the financial markets determine that 
a rotational audit scheme does in fact lower investor confidence in the control 
environment of the companies, a mechanism is built in to return to a full 404 audit 
scheme.  While too many qualitative factors may prevent us from ever identifying the 
true value of the costs and benefits of 404 testing, the decision of whether or not to 
comply should at least be in the hands of those stakeholders most affected by them.    
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Exhibit A47 
 
                                                 
47
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Valley Leadership Council  2/26/07 
Status  Events & Triggers  Audit Type  
 
External Internal  
Year 1  Clean Opinion.  Full Scope Audit.  Full Scope Audit.  
Year 2   Full Scope Audit for 1/3 of 
Companies, Based on a 
Rotating Schedule; 
Attestation and 
Management Certifications 
to Correspond. 
Rotation of key control 
testing based on risk 
assessment.*  
Year 3   Full Scope Audit for 1/3 of 
Companies, Based on a 
Rotating Schedule; 
Attestation and 
Management Certifications 
to Correspond. 
Rotation of key control 
testing based on risk 
assessment.  
Year 4 +                                            Cycle continues. 
Any Year - 
Isolated Material 
Weakness  
Isolated Material Weakness: 
Limited to a single functional 
area or financial statement line 
item. (e.g., tax process or A/R 
financial statement line item).  
Limited Scope Audit.  Full examination audit of 
key controls related to 
process or financial 
statement line item where 
material deficiency 
occurred. Rotation of key 
control testing based on 
risk assessment.  
Any Year - 
Pervasive 
Material 
Weakness  
Pervasive Material Weakness: 
More than one material 
weakness or multiple 
significant deficiencies 
involving a pervasive break-
down in controls (e.g., 
personnel hiring / staffing 
deficiencies or pervasive lack 
of appropriate reconciliations 
or management reviews).  
Full Scope Audit.  Full Scope Audit.  
Plus - 1 Year  Clean Opinion.  Full Scope Audit.  Full Scope Audit.  
(repeat cycle 
above)  
Any Year - 
Material change 
in entity-wide 
controls over 
financial reporting  
For example, major changes in 
key company personnel or an 
ERP implementation.  
Full or Limited Scope Audit, 
based on risk assessment. 
If change or factors could 
have a pervasive impact on 
processes and/or financial 
statement accounts, then 
full examination is called 
for.  
Full or Limited Scope 
Audit, based on risk 
assessment.  
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Exhibit B48 
 
 
SUMMARY OF COMPETITIVE MEASURES 
 
Measure Historical Average 2007 Improvement/ 
Decline 
U.S. Share of Equity 
Raised in Global Public 
Markets 
 
1996-2005: 33.2% 
 
22.0 % 
 
Worse 
Global IPOs by Foreign 
Companies (By value) 
on U.S. Markets 
 
1996-2005: 30.9% 
 
7.7% 
Worse 
Largest Global IPOs on 
U.S. Markets 
1996: 8 / 20 0 / 20 Worse 
IPOs of U.S. Companies 
Abroad 
1996-2005: .1% 4.3% Worse 
Cross-Listings in U.S. 
by Foreign Companies 
2000-2005: 21 4 Worse 
Foreign Delisting Rates 
on the NYSE 
1997-2005: 5.2% 12.4% Worse 
U.S. Share of Global 
Market Capitalization 
1990-2005: 43.6% 35.2% Worse 
U.S. Share of the Value 
of Global Share Trading 
1990-2005: 50.7% 41.2% Worse 
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